Casenote: Fair Trial / Free Press by Schlottman, Lindsay
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 7
Number 1 October, 1976 Article 7
10-1976
Casenote: Fair Trial / Free Press
Lindsay Schlottman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schlottman, Lindsay (1976) "Casenote: Fair Trial / Free Press," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 7 : No. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol7/iss1/7
I I
ity to consider the character of the de-
fendant and the circumstances sur-
rounding the offense as a necessary part
of the procedure leading to the imposi-
tion of the death sentence.
Thus the Supreme Court, which had
invalidated death sentences imposed
under a jury's unfettered discretion in
Furman, held that the lack of exercise of
any jury discretion is equally unconstitu-
tional when imposing the death sen-
tence. Carefully guided discretion exer-
cised by the sentencing authority is re-
quired.
As a result of these decisions, it ap-
pears that Art. 27, §413, MD. ANN CODE
(1976 Repl. Vol.), contains a mandatory
death penalty law which is unable to
withstand a constitutional challenge. See
Woodson and Roberts, supra. Under
this section, a conviction for any one of
the eight enumerated categories of first
degree murder results in a mandatory
death sentence. Under the statute, no
consideration of the individual cir-
cumstances surrounding the defendant
and the offense may enter into the sen-
tencing process. Consequently, the sta-
tute violates the "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment" Clause. Maryland can, of
course, amend its law to conform with
the approved standards in Gregg, Prof-
fitt, Jurek, or the Model Penal Code and





It had been a typical Saturday eve-
ning on October 18, 1975 in the farming
town of Sutherland, Nebraska-until
word began to spread of a mass murder.
Towspeople were frightened as the
search for the murderer began. Local,
regional and even national reporters
flooded the area, adding to the panic
and confusion. Finally, early Sunday
morning, a suspect named Charles
Erwin Simants was arrested and charged
with six counts of murder. Mr. and Mrs.
Henry Kellie, their son David, and three
grandchildren lay dead. The charges
were amended later to include sexual as-
sault.
Rumors began circulating of a confes-
sion by Simants. Because of his concern
that Simants' trial be free of prejudicial
publicity, the County Judge entered a
restrictive order on October 22 banning
full news coverage of the public prelimi-
nary hearing until a jury could be im-
paneled. Several press and broadcast
associations, publishers, and individual
reporters moved for leave to intervene in
the state District Court, asking that the
order imposed by the County Court be
vacated. The District Judge granted this
motion to intervene, and then entered
his own restrictive order on October 27,
detailing items not to be reported. The
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state Supreme Court modified the Dis-
trict Judge's order on December 2, pro-
hibiting reporting of only three matters:
"(a) the existence and nature of any con-
fessions or admissions made by the de-
fendant to law enforcement officers, (b)
any confessions or admissions made to
any third parties, except members of the
press, and (c) other facts 'strongly im-
plicative' of the accused." Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 96 S.Ct.
2791, 2796 (1976).
The press associations, et al. appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari to decide whether this
order of the state court violated the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of the
press.
On June 30, 1976, the United States
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that
the restrictive order of the state Supreme
Court was an unconstitutional violation
of the First Amendment. While this deci-
sion does not completely disallow "gag
orders", it nearly does so. Chief Justice
Burger delivered the opinion for the
Court, first reviewing the historical
background of First Amendment/Sixth
Amendment clashes. He noted that
drafters of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights "were intimately familiar with
the clash of the adversary system and the
part that passions of the populace some-
times play in influencing potential
jurors." Id. at 2797. Yet, liberty of
humankind has been viewed as essen-
tially dependent upon the freedom of
the press.
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of
trial by an impartial jury is threatened
when "sensational" cases are involved.
The modern news media communicates
instantly and pervasively. In highly pub-
licized trials this often makes it difficult to
find jurors who are without fixed opin-
ions as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. The trial judge can help
guarantee a fair trial by taking " 'reme-
dial measures that will prevent the pre-
judice at its inception.' " Nebraska v.
Stuart, supra at 2800, quotingSheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63
(1966). Such measures may include
conducting a particularly careful voir
dire; continuing or transferring the case;
sequestering the jury; emphatically and
clearly instructing the jurors; ordering
prosecutors, police, court officials and at-
torneys not to discuss the case publicly:
or even ordering a new trial. Yet, "pre-
trial publicity-even pervasive, ad-
verse publicity-does not inevitably lead
to an unfair trial." Nebraska v. Stuart,
supra at 2800. The Supreme Court has
focused many times on means other
than restrictive gag orders which ensure
that a defendant receives a fair trial by an
impartial jury.
The First Amendment guarantee of a
free press has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as affording special pro-
tection against court orders that impose
a prior restraint on free speech. Although
freedom of speech and freedom of the
press are not considered absolute rights
by the Court, a prior restraint of these
freedoms comes to the Supreme Court
with a " 'heavy presumption' against its
constitutional validity." Id. at 2802, cit-
ing Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1971). A
court issuing a restrictive order thus has a
heavy burden to bear each time it seeks
to place a prior restraint upon speech.
Indeed, "prior restraints on speech and
publication are the most serious and the
least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights." Nebraska v. Stuart,
supra at 2802. Speech is chilled; publica-
tions held in abeyance for even a few
days lose their impact and relevance. Ef-
fective criminal judicial administration in
particular is actually enhanced by a free
press.
"The press does not simply publish in-
formation about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting
the police, prosecutors, and judicial pro-
cesses to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism." Id. at 2803, quoting Shep-
pard v. Maxwell, supra at 350. Against
this background of the tension between
First and Sixth Amendment rights, the
Supreme Court decided the present
case.
The Court was persuaded that the trial
judge's determination (that pre-trial pub-
licity might impair Simants' right to a fair
trial) was reasonable; however, the
Court pointed out that his conclusion
"as to the impact of such publicity was of
necessity speculative, dealing as he was
with factors unknown and unknow-
able." Nebraska v. Stuart, supra at
2804. No express findings were made by
the trial court as to whether alternatives
to the gag order would suffice. Even the
state Supreme Court only implied that
such alternative measures might not be
adequate. Prior restraint is an extreme
measure to be taken only when the al-
ternative measures will not protect the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
Practical problems also exist in using
prior restraint as a means of protecting
the defendant's rights.
"The dilemma posed underscores
how difficult it is for trial judges to predict
what information will in fact undermine
the impartiality of jurors, and the diffi-
culty of drafting an order that will effec-
tively keep prejudicial information from
prospective jurors." Id. at 2806.
Courts issuing gag orders have limited
jurisdictions; news reporters outside of
the jurisdiction are not bound by such
orders. Also, information that isn't obvi-
ously prejudicial at first glance may later
emerge as irreparably damaging to the
defendant's right to an impartial jury. Fi-
nally, it is questionable whether rumors
spread by word of mouth are more or
less prejudicial than news reports. In
short, given these and other practical dif-
ficulties, it is not clear that prior restraint
would have protected Simants' rights
under the Sixth Amendment.
The Supreme Court reviewed the
language of the order itself and con-
cluded that the order was not support-
able on that basis. First, the order pro-
hibited the reporting of events at a
public hearing, which is clearly uncon-
stitutional. Second, the prohibition of
the publication of facts "strongly implica-
tive" of Simants is vague and overbroad,
rendering it impermissible under the
Constitution.
In its conclusion, the Supreme Court
again recognized the adverse impact that
pre-trial publicity can have on a defen-
dant's trial. Yet, alternative measures do
exist to alleviate this danger. The state
court did not demonstrate the "probabil-
ity" that pre-trial publicity would gravely
affect Simants' right to an impartial jury.
Prior restraint requires a degree of cer-
tainty in determining this probability.
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